Last Week's Major Developments in Sanctions - March 2, 2026, to February 6, 2026

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Monday, March 2

• The EU Council extended the sanctions imposed pursuant to Decision 2014/119/CFSP, which imposes sanctions against certain persons, entities, and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine, that were set to expire on March 6, 2026, for another year until March 6, 2027.(Here)

• OFSI delisted Al-Nusra Front. (Here)

• OFAC imposed blocking sanctions against four individuals and one entity, the Rwanda Defence Force, for being responsible for human rights abuses and a mass displacement crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. (Here, the Department of the Treasury's press release, and the Department of State's press release). Concurrent with the designation of the Rwanda Defence Force, OFAC issued DRC-related General License 1, "Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving the Rwanda Defence Force."

Tuesday, March 3

• There was no major development on this day.

Wednesday, March 4

• OFAC issued six new FAQs related to its Venezuela sanctions program. (Here)

  • FAQ 1239: explains the authorization provided by Venezuela General License 48 for U.S. persons to engage in certain transactions involving the exploration and production of oil or gas in Venezuela.

  • FAQ 1240: explains the scope of GL 49, which authorizes the entry into contingent contracts for new investments in the Venezuelan oil or gas sectors.

  • FAQ 1241: explains specific prohibitions and limitations within GL 48, detailing which types of goods, technology, or services are excluded from the authorization.

  • FAQ 1242: explains the authorization under GL 50A for certain listed entities to engage in transactions related to oil or gas sector operations in Venezuela.

  • FAQ 1243: explains what alternative authorizations exist for companies not listed in GL 50A to support oil or gas projects in Venezuela, such as through GL 48 or GL 49.

  • FAQ 1244: explains the case-by-case criteria OFAC will use to assess specific license applications for performing contingent contracts executed under GL 49.

  
  

Thursday, March 5

• To assist UK persons in understanding the UK sanctions against Belarus, the UK government published a full list of exceptions under its Belarus sanctions regime on one page. (Here) The UK government also published a full list of considerations for granting trade sanctions licenses under its Belarus sanctions regime. (Here) These considerations are the specific criteria that a licensing officer must evaluate when reviewing an application.

• OFAC delisted three vessels that were sanctioned under its Venezuela sanctions program. (Here)

• OFAC replaced General License 129 with General License 129A under its Venezuela sanctions program. The new license has removed the expiration date of the authorization. (Here)

• Driven by a severe disruption in global oil supplies caused by the outbreak of war involving Iran and Israel, OFAC issues Russia-related General License 133, "Authorizing the Delivery and Sale of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products of Russian Federation Origin Loaded on Vessels as of March 5, 2026, to India," to facilitate more supply in the global oil market. (Here) The General License authorizes all transactions prohibited

  by the several sanctions program that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the sale, delivery, or offloading of crude oil or petroleum products of Russian Federation origin loaded on any vessel, including vessels blocked under the several authorities, provided certain conditions are met for one month until April 4.

Friday, March 6

• OFAC issued Venezuela-related General License 51, "Authorizing Certain Activities Involving Venezuelan-Origin Gold." (Here)

• In AML-related development, FinCEN assessed a record-breaking $80 million penalty against broker-dealer Canaccord Genuity LLC for willful violations of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA). The firm admitted to failing to maintain an effective anti-money laundering program, neglecting customer due diligence, and failing to file at least 160 suspicious activity reports related to thousands of suspicious transactions. These systemic failures allowed high-risk actors, including those linked to Russian oligarchs and microcap fraud schemes, to access the U.S. financial system without proper oversight. (Here)