Last Week's Major Developments in Sanctions - July 13 to July 17, 2026

Monday, July 13

• OFSI extended General Licence INT/2025/6641960, which permits Non-DP Account Holders to transfer Investment Assets and Client Money out of brokerage accounts held at designated DP Brokers to non-designated brokers, has been extended by OFSI. The license, originally effective from 18 July 2025, was amended on 13 July 2026 to extend its expiry from 16 July 2026 to 16 July 2027, with all other permissions, conditions, and reporting requirements remaining unchanged. (Here)

• The UK Government imposed asset freezing sanctions on the Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right (IMCR, aka HAYI/Ashab al-Yamin) under the Iran (Sanctions) Regulations 2023, targeting Iran-backed proxy/criminal networks conducting hostile activity and attacks against persons and assets in the UK and abroad. (Here)

• The UK Government imposed asset freezing sanctions on 24 individuals/entities under the Cyber (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 and the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 as part of a joint UK-EU package alongside the EU's own cyber sanctions package. The sanctions target Russian state-backed cybercriminal and disinformation networks - GRU Unit 29155 cyber operations, Lumma Stealer credential-theft infrastructure, and Rybar LLC's anti-Ukraine disinformation network. (Here)

• The EU Council imposed asset freezing sanctions on 15 individuals and one entity (Russian, and Ukrainian nationals employed in occupied-territory facilities) for serious human rights violations against Ukrainian prisoners of war and civilian detainees, split across the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (eight individuals, one entity) and the Russia situation regime (seven individuals). (Here)

• The EU Council imposed asset freezing sanctions on nine individuals (Russian) and four entities (Russian, with one Latvia-registered subsidiary) under its cyber sanctions regime (Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/797, as amended by 2026/1713) and Russia destabilising activities regime (Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643), for cyber-attacks and hybrid activities against the EU and its member states, including ransomware, DDoS, and infostealer campaigns targeting critical infrastructure, government agencies, and financial institutions. (Here)

• The EU Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2026/1438 to renew until 29 July 2027 the additional restrictive measures on Haiti set out in Articles 2a(1) and 3a(1)-(2) which had been due to expire on 29 July 2026. The renewal followed a review by the Council in light of the continued gravity of the situation in Haiti. While the EU Council announced the extension on 26 June 2026, the Council Decision was made publicly available today. (Here)

• The U.S. Department of State imposed blocking sanctions on ten entities (all Cuba) under its Cuba sanctions program (E.O. 14404) for supporting the Cuban government's mechanisms of repression and funneling revenue to sustain the government and its security apparatus. The designations target two categories: instruments of repression and sources of funding across state-owned entities, paramilitary, and Cuban ministeries. In the same vein, OFAC issued Cuba-related FAQ 1262. (Here)

• OFAC imposed blocking sanctions on two individuals (one Ukrainian, one Belarusian) and one entity (in Ukraine) under its Cyber sanctions program for enabling ransomware attacks against Americans. The designations target First VPN Service (1VPNS), a Ukraine-based VPN provider whose infrastructure has been used by ransomware groups to hide attack origins, deploy malware, and manage exfiltrated data against U.S. businesses, financial services firms, hospitals, and municipal governments, along with its administrator (who used false identities to evade provider scrutiny) and a Belarus-based seller of "cryptors" used to disguise ransomware and other malware from detection. (Here)

• The EU Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2026/1709 imposing asset freezing sanctions against 11 individuals and 5 entities, bringing the list to 98 individuals and 7 entities. Four individuals and five entities were designated for providing technical/material support to Russia's surveillance and repression apparatus targeting journalists, opposition figures and war critics. The remaining seven individuals, staff of Penal Colony No 10 in Mordovia were listed for responsibility over torture and inhuman treatment of Ukrainian POWs and civilian detainees. (Here)

• EU Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2026/1705 and Regulation (EU) 2026/1724 to strengthen the EU's Sudan sanctions regime by targeting the war economy that finances the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The measures introduce a new Article 2a prohibiting the purchase, import or transfer of gold originating in and exported from Sudan after 15 July 2026, and a new Article 2b prohibiting the sale, supply, transfer or export of mercury and cyanide (goods used in gold mining/exploitation, including CN code 2837 11) to any person, entity or body in Sudan or for use there, with both prohibitions extending to related technical assistance, brokering, and financial services; exceptions apply for gold needed for the official purposes of immune diplomatic missions, consular posts and international organizations, for goods intended for humanitarian purposes, public health emergencies, disaster response, or mitigation of serious risks to health, safety or the environment, and for wind-down of pre-existing mercury/cyanide contracts concluded before 15 July 2026, whose execution is permitted until 16 January 2027. (Here)

Tuesday, July 14

• A dual U.S.-Iranian national of Natick, Massachusetts, was convicted facing up to 20 years in prison following a 14-day jury trial in Boston federal court of one count of conspiracy to violate the IEEPA and the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR), and two counts of substantive IEEPA/ITSR violations; sentencing is scheduled for October 13. According to court documents, the individual conspired with the founder of Iranian navigation-systems manufacturer SDRA, whose Sepehr Navigation System supplies the IRGC's drone and missile programs to procure U.S.-origin electronic components from a Massachusetts microelectronics manufacturer and reexport them to Iran via a Swiss front company, Illumove SA, evading export controls. Prosecutors noted that navigation components matching SDRA's technology were recovered from the Iranian Shahed drone used in the January 2024 Tower 22 attack that killed three U.S. service members. The individual remains a fugitive. (Here)

• The UN Security Council's 1533 Sanctions Committee expanded its DRC sanctions list on adding six individuals and two entities linked to the armed groups driving instability in eastern DRC. The designations target senior leadership and commanders across four groups: the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) and its ally M23/ARC, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), and Twirwaneho, a South Kivu militia active since 2008–2010. Those listed include group leaders, military commanders, and an intelligence chief, reflecting the Committee's continued focus on the command structures sustaining armed group activity in North and South Kivu. (Here)

• ECJU released its quarterly licensing statistics, covering Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs), Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs), and related trade control licences processed through the SPIRE and LITE systems. The Q4 2025 export licensing data shows falling volumes and values, above-average refusals, and below-target (but improving) processing times, driven by growing casework complexity, sanctions expansion, and the ongoing SPIRE-to-LITE system transition. (Here)

• OFAC issued Iran-related General License Z, authorizing wind-down financial transactions, safe docking/departure (excluding Iranian or Russian ports), crew safety, emergency repairs, and cargo offloading (for cargo loaded on or before July 14, 2026) involving the persons and vessels blocked in today's Shamkhani-related action. The license runs through 12:01 a.m. EDT on September 12, 2026, and requires any payments to blocked persons to go into a blocked, interest-bearing U.S. account; it does not authorize new commercial contracts or any other transactions otherwise prohibited under E.O. 13902 or the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations. (Here)

• OFAC imposed blocking sanctions on 10 individuals (five in Iran, two in India, and one each in Denmark, Italy, and the United Kingdom) and 24 entities (10 in the UAE, 6 in the Marshall Islands, two each in Iran, Hong Kong, and Saint Kitts and Nevis, and one each in Singapore and India) under its Iran sanctions program (E.O. 13902) for facilitating the illicit shipping, oil export, and sanctions evasion network of Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani. OFAC also imposed blocking sanctions on 20 vessels as blocked property (5 flagged in Antigua and Barbuda, 4 each flagged in Iran and Panama, 4 with unknown flags formerly registered in Palau, and 1 each flagged in Barbados, Palau, and Saint Kitts and Nevis) operating within the network's tanker, containerized shipping, and Caspian Sea fleets. (Here)

Wednesday, July 15

• A former senior adviser in the Federal Reserve Board of Governors' Division of International Finance (2010–2021), was sentenced to 38 months in federal prison and 12 months of supervised release for making false statements to federal investigators. According to court records, Rogers developed a clandestine relationship beginning in 2017 with Hummin Lee, a Chinese intelligence operative, to whom he passed restricted, nonpublic Federal Reserve information including material related to Federal Open Market Committee deliberations and interest rate decisions via stripped-classification documents and personal email, receiving financial benefits and career assistance in return. A federal jury convicted Rogers on February 3, 2026 of lying to Federal Reserve OIG investigators who had asked him directly whether he'd shared restricted information outside the Board; prosecutors had sought a 60-month sentence. (Here)

• The French Government imposed asset freezing sanctions against one individual under France's autonomous counter-terrorims sanctions regime. (Here)

• ECJU published its Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2025 on 15 July 2026, covering licensing activity, compliance, and enforcement under the Export Control Act 2002 for the 2025 calendar year. Key highlights of the report:

  1. Licensing volumes: 14,849 SIEL applications received in 2025; 10,414 issued, 501 refused/rejected, 4 revoked. Refusal rate fell to 3.6% (from 4.6% in 2024).

  2. Refusal grounds: Criterion 7 (diversion risk) remained the leading basis (437 cases), followed by MEUC catch-all controls (194) and Criterion 5/national security (113).

  3. Performance: Neither the 20-working-day (70%) nor 60-working-day (99%) processing targets were met, attributed to the LITE/SPIRE dual-system transition (87% of SIELs now processed via LITE) and rising case complexity linked to Russia sanctions, Gaza, and dual-use/emerging-tech reviews.

  4. Israel/Gaza: ECJU continued refusing licences carrying risk of use in Gaza operations; F-35 component exclusion (except direct-to-Israel parts, still suspended) upheld by High Court and Court of Appeal.

  5. Russia/Ukraine: £4.5bn in UK military support to Ukraine in 2025 (incl. £1.5bn via the ERA loan); continued use of the Common High Priority List to flag circumvention risk in third countries.

  6. Other geopolitical actions: Armenia/Azerbaijan arms embargo lifted (13 Oct 2025); Rwanda licences revoked/restricted following DRC advances; Iran snapback sanctions triggered (28 Aug 2025, with UK/Germany/France).

  7. Enforcement: 4 HMRC compound settlements totaling £4,294,409.64; 212 warning letters from voluntary disclosures; 10 ongoing criminal investigations, 4 awaiting trial. (Here)

• OFAC imposed blocking sanctions on four individuals (one in Iran, one in Italy, and two in Russia) and three entities (one in Iran, one in Nigeria, and one in Russia) under its non-proliferation sanctions program for supporting IRGC weapons procurement efforts. The designations target Behrouz Namazi, an Iranian national who heads Nika Jet Company and sought to secure weapons on behalf of the IRGC, along with his intermediary network which used foreign aviation, transport, and financial conduits to obscure the IRGC's procurement and move material and personnel globally. (Here)

Thursday, July 16

• The EU Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2026/1804 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP to postpone the mechanism for adjusting the Russian crude oil price cap. Under the amendment, the Commission's notice of the average market price of Russian crude oil for the 22-week period from 15 January to 17 June 2026 will be published on 23 July 2026, with the corresponding amendment to Annex XXVIII of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 applying from 15 August 2026; the current price cap remains in effect until then. The Decision entered into force on 17 July 2026, the day following its publication in the Official Journal. (Here)

• OFSI amended General Licence INT/2025/5787748 to update the reporting requirement. (Here)

• The UK Government imposed asset freezing sanctions on 2 individuals (Sudan) and 9 entities (7 UAE-based, 1 Hong Kong-based, 1 Sudan-based) under the Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 for supplying money, weapons, and gold-derived revenue to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The package targets a suspected RSF financier and procurement facilitator operating through a Dubai-based network of real estate and holding companies. (Here)

• The U.S. Department of State designated the Juárez Cartel and Los Viagras (Mexico) as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists under Executive Order 13224 for conducting narco-terrorism, including attacks on Americans, Mexican security forces, and civilians. The designations cite the cartels' violent narcotics trafficking operations, including the 2019 Sonora massacre of nine U.S. citizens by La Línea, the Juárez Cartel's dominant faction, and take effect upon publication in the Federal Register. (Here)

Friday, July 17

• The EU Commission amended one FAQ on the definition of "operators" in the comprehensive Frequently asked questions on restrictions on Russian State-owned media adopted following Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine. (Here)

• The national emergency declared in E.O. 13936 of July 14, 2020 ("The President's Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization") expired on July 14, 2026. OFAC clarified that the expiration does not repeal or otherwise affect the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 (HKHRDA) or the Hong Kong Autonomy Act (HKAA) of 2020, both of which remain in effect. As a result of the expiration, OFAC removed from the SDN List all individuals whose property had been blocked solely pursuant to IEEPA authority under E.O. 13936. Of the 48 individuals delisted, 39 remain sanctioned under the HKAA and were concurrently added to OFAC's Non-SDN Menu-Based Sanctions List (NS-MBS List). Assets blocked prior to July 14, 2026 for these individuals remain frozen under the HKAA designation. The remaining 9 individuals were fully removed from OFAC's sanctions lists. (Here)

• OFAC issues a Venezuela-related FAQ in respect of payments to the Government of Venezuela into the Foreign Government Deposit Funds Account for transactions related to GL 60. (Here)

• The EU Council adopted Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/1780 imposing asset freezing sanctions one individual (Russia) and five entities (Russia) targeting actions undermining Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence, for supporting Russia's military-industrial complex and drone warfare capabilities. The designations target the Chairman of the Board of the ABS Electro group along with its subsidiaries and companies supplying automated control systems to Russia's energy sector. (Here)

Recommendation of the Week

The Wolfsberg Group published Guidance on the Provision of Banking Services to non-bank Payment Service Providers (PSP) on July 15, 2026, establishing a risk-based framework for financial institutions managing financial crime risk in non-bank PSP relationships. The guidance builds on the Group's correspondent banking work and 2023 Payment Transparency Standards, and incorporates the June 2025 updates to FATF Recommendation 16 on originator/beneficiary information in wire transfers. It covers the three main non-bank PSP business models along with partnership structures such as Banking-as-a-Service and Sponsored (FBO) Accounts, and sets out due diligence expectations covering business model risk, licensing, jurisdictional exposure, and the non-bank PSP's own financial crime controls. (Here, press release)